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of the

STATE OF UTAH
0 ..A. T..:\_l\GREN, ETC.,
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INGALLS
vs.
P_BlTDENTIAL FEDER.AL SAVIX<iS & LOAN ASS'N, et al 124798

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATE~IENT

OF FACTS
Respondent does not controvert the statement of
facts of appellant but is of the opinion that a statement
in chronological order n1ay be helpful to the Court.
On __._~pril 2, 1959 the respondent, Adeline M. Ingalls,
and Ben Ste,vart opened a joint savings account, #45889,
'vith Prudential Federal Savings and L·oan Association
and entered into a written contract as follows:
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The undersigned hereby apply for a membership and for a savings share account in the Prudential Federal Savings and Loan Association
and for the issuance of evidence of membership
in the approved form in the joint names of the
undersigned as joint tenants with the right of
survivorship and not as tenants in common. Receipt is hereby acknowledged and a copy of the
charter and by-laws of s.aid association. Specimens of the signatures of the undersigned are
shown below and the association is hereby authorized to act without further inquiry in accordance
with writings bearing any such signature; it being understood and agreed that any of the undersigned who shall first act shall have power to
act in all matters related to the membership and
any share account in said association held by
the undersigned, whether the other person or persons named in the certificate be living or not.
The repurchase or redemption value of any such
share account or other rights relating thereto
may be paid or delivered in whole or in part to
any one of the undersigned who shall first act,
and such payment or delivery of a receipt or
acquittance signed by any one of the undersigned
shall be a valid and sufficient release and discharge of said asocation. ('c·ase #124798, pages
1 and 12.)
On the same day the same persons opened a joint
savings account with American Savings & Loan Association, #OS-14673, and made a contract as follows:
As Joint Tenants with right of survivorship
and not as tenants in common, and not as tenants
by the entirey, the undersigned hereby apply for
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a 1ne1nbership and a withdrawable account in the
.A.MF~R lCAN SA \:INGS & LOAN ASSO·CIATI 0 N", san1e to be issued subject to the· provisions
of the Laws under which the Association is organized and operating and the Articles of Incorporation and By-laws of the Ass·ociation.
You are directed to act pursuant to any one
or more of the joint tenants' signatures, shown
below, in any manner in connection with this
account and to pay without an liability for such
payment, to any one or the survivor or survivors
at any time. It is agreed by the signatory parties
with each other and by the parties with you that
any funds placed in or added to the account by
any one of the parties is and shall be conclusively
intended to be a gift at that time of such funds t'o
the other signatory party or parties to the extent
of his or their pro rata interest in the account.
(Case #124 797, pages 1, 4, and 16.)
On February 7, 1960 Ben Stewart, one 'Of the joint
tenants named in said joint accounts, died. Thereafter,
0. A. Tangren, the appellant, was appointed executor
of the estate of Ben Stewart. On the date of the death
of Ben Stewart there was on deposit in the aceount with
Prudential Federal Savings and Loan Association the
sun1 of $10,000, and on deposit on account with American
Savings & Loan Association he sum of $10,247.09,
'Yhich sums have since been deposited with the Clerk of
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. (Case #124797,
pages 2 and 16; case #124798, pages 2. and 12.)
On February 4, 1960, three days prior to the death
of Ben Ste,vart, an action was filed in the District Court
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of Salt Lake ·County on behalf of Ben Stewart against
the respondent. The Plaintiff sought an adjudication
that the accounts referred to herein were his property,
free and clear of any claim :of the resp·ondent. At about
the same time Ben Stewart caused a letter to be sent
to each of the loan companies, as follows:
You "\\7ill please take notice that when I had
Adeline 1\1. Ingalls name placed on my savings
account "\vith you, #--------------------, I little realized
that I was placing her in a position equal to
myself with respect to said account. I never intended that that should happen. I therefore direct that you do not let the said Adeline M. Ingalls,
or any one on her behalf, withdraw any funds
from that account. I am taking proper measures
to have her name removed from the account."
(Case #124252, page 1; case #124798, pages 10
and 11, an dcase #12-±797 pages 6 and 15.)
Respondent commenced separate actions on March
16, 1960 against each of the loan companies and the
appellant for the purpose of recovering the funds on
depusit in said joint accounts. F:or convenience, the
action commenced by Ben Stewart will be called the
Stewart action and the actions commenced by the respondent will be called the Ingalls actions. (·Case #124797,
page 3 ; case #124 798, page 3.)
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss in the Stewart
action, and in the Ingalls actions filed n1otions to disIniss the counterclaims of the appellant and motions for
su1nmary judgment. These motions "~ere consolidated
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for hearing and argued before the Honorable Merrill
C. Faux on l\Iay 31, 1960. On June 10, 19·60 an order
for dismissal was entered in the Stewart action and
orders dis1nissing the counterclaims of the appellant
were entered in the Ingalls actions, with provisions in
eaeh case that the appellant could amend within ten days.
(Case #124252, pages 12-18.) No amendment was made.
Consequently, on June 21, 1960 an order dismissing the
Ste,Yart action was entered, and in the Ingalls actions
summary judgments were entered in favor of R.esp:ondent, and orders dismissing the counterclaims of Appellant
"\Vere entered. This appeal is from the orders of June 10,
1960 and June 21, 1960. (Case #124797, pages 26-31 ;
case #124798, pages 32, 33 and 35-38.)

STAT'EMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
A CONCLUSIVE PRESUMP'TION O·F INTENTION TO
CREATE A JOINT TENANCY IN THE FUNDS IN QUESTION APPLIES IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENT.

POINT II.
THE JOINT TENANCY AGREEMEN'T IS NOT DESTROYED BY THE NOTICE TO THE LOAN ·COMPANIES.

POINT III.
THE JOINT TENANCY AGREEMENT IS UNIMPAIRED
BY THE STEW ART ACTION.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
A CONCLUSIVE PRESUMP'TION OF INTENTION TO
CREAT·E A JOINT T.ENANCY IN THE FUNDS IN QUESTION APPLIES IN FAVOR OF 'THE RESPONDENT.

This Court has dealt with joint bank aceounts in
the following cases: Holt v. Bayles, 85 Utah 364, 39 P.
2d 715; Neill v. Royce, 101 Utah 181, 120 P. 2d 327;
Greener v. Greener, 116 Utah 571, 212 P. 2d 194; First
Security Bank of Utah, N. A. v. Demiris, 354 P. 2d 97.
In Holt v. Bayles the parties executed a joint tenancy
agreement card and left it with the bank. The agreement
contained all the essentials of joint tenancy. After the
death of one of the joint tenants the survivor withdrew
the funds and the action was between a representative
of the estate of the deceased joint tenant and the surviving j'Oint tenant. This Court held in favor of the
survivor and stated, on page 718 of 39 P. 2d:
Where there is a joint agreement executed
by the parties "\Yhich clearly declares the intention to create a joint interest of each in the
deposit or credit, the courts will sustain such
intention thus expressed, especially where the
contract is not attacked for fraud, mistake incapacity, or other infirmity. The plaintiffs have
made no such attack on the instrument before us,
but merely say that it is lacking in substance to
·create a joint tenancy or joint ownership in the
dep-osit with right of survivorship. With this
contention we cannot agree, since the language is

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7

elPar and explicit as expressing an intention to
do that very thing. . . .
\V e do not regard the question of the original
ownership of the money as controlling under the
particular facts of this case.
The Court stated further, on page 719:
Where such intention is clearly expressed in
a written contract executed by the parties, whi'ch
remained unaltered, and there is no fraud, undue
influence, mistake, or other infirmity alleged, the
question of intention ceases to be an issue and
the courts are bound by the agreement. In such
cases the delivery to and p'Ossession of the passbook is not determinative of ownership of the
account, since possession 'Of the book is ordinarily
in one of the parties, not both at the same time,
and delivery to one must, in the nature of things,
be a delivery t'O both.''
And again on page 719 the Court stated:
In many states joint deposits are regulated
by statute, under which the survivor is entitled
to the fund without regard to the prior ownership
or title to the property. The controlling quesion involved is the intention of the parties making
the deposit, and not its mere form. Where such
intention is evidenced by a written agreement
this queston of intention ceases to be an issue,
and the courts are bound by the agreement.
The rule of Holt vs. Bayles has been referred to in
later Utah cases as a conclusive presumption of intention
in the creation of a joint tenancy. Thus, in Neill v. Royce,
supra, the conclusive presumption of Holt v. Bayles was
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recognized, but as both parties to the joint tenancy agreement were alive the Court held that the presumption 'vas
not conclusive during the joint lives of the parties, but
until the death of one of the parties was rebuttable and
could be overcome by clear and convincing proof to the
contrary. The Cuurt also held that the p,roof submitted
in that particular case did not overcome the presumption.
Likewise, in Greener v. Greener, where both parties to
the agreemnt were alive, this Court followed Holt v.
Bayles but with the limitation as in Neill v. Royce. However, in the Greener case it was held that the proof was
sufficient to overcome the presumption of joint tenancy.
Again, in the very recent Demiris case the Court states,
"We are not here disagreeing with the ruling in the case
of Hult v. Bayles." The doctrine of Holt v. Bayles is
firmly established in this State.
The instant case falls within the rule of Holt v.
Bayles. The agreement cards signed by the parties at the
time of making the deposits contained the essential elements of a joint tenancy agreement and clearly declared
their intention to create a joint tenancy in the funds in
question. Therefore, under the rule of Holt v. Bayles,
upon the death of Ben Stewart and in the absence of
fraud, mistake and undue influence, discussion of which
appears in Point III, the conclusive presumption of intention to create a true joint tenancy became operative
and ownership of the funds vested in Respondent as surviving joint tenant.

POINT II.
THE JOINT TENANCY AGREEMEN'T IS NOT DESTROYED BY THE NOTICE TO THE LOAN COMP ANTES.

The affect of notice to the loan companies is capably
treated in the leading case of Moskowitz v. Marrow, 167
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N. E. 506; 66 A. L. R. 870, the facts being as follows: On
April :2S, 1~):2-t Fannie 1\fanheimer was the o'vner of substantial deposits in her individual name in four accounts.
On that date she n1ade a transfer of the funds in each of
the four banks creating deposits jointly with herself and
l'Parl I-Iarris, her granddaughter. The passbooks were
delivered to the granddaughter. On December 5, 1924
Fannie delivered a writing to each of the four banks,
notifying each of them that the privilege granted by her
to Pearl to withdraw any money from any account was
revoked and instructed the banks to honor no signature
other than her own for withdrawal. In January, 1925,
Fannie withdrew the deposits in two of the banks and redeposited them to the credit of herself individually. In
April, 1925 the accounts in the latier two banks were
reestablished in the joint names of herself and Pearl,
payable to the survivor. On May 4, 1925 Fannie died. The
contest is between the executor of her estate and Pearl as
to the ownership of the funds in the bank accounts. The
lower eourt held with respect to the two accounts which
had been reestablished in the joint names that the survivor was entitled to such deposits but with respect to
the two accounts which had not been disturbed after the
notice had been given to the banks the survivor was not
entitled to those accounts for the reason that the notice
,,,.as effectual to revoke the joint tenancy arrangement.
The appellant court, however, held that the survivor was
entitled to the funds in all of the accounts and that the
notice did not destroy the right of the· survivor to the
funds. Justice Cardozo wrote a concurring opinion. With
respect to the affect of notice, Justice Cardoza says, on
page 880 of 66 A.L.R. :
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The tenancy, if joint in its creation, was
not destroyed by revocation. Cf. Kelly v. Beers,
supra, 194 N. Y. at page 58, 128 Am. St. Rep.
543, 86 N. E. 980. If the form of the deposit was
an expression of the true agreement, there could
be no change of ownership thereafter by an ex
parte declaration ;
and on page 881 :
A notice of revocation is not a notice of lis pendens.
Further, on page 881:
·To put it differently, title to the accounts
was unaffected by the notice of withdrawal in the
absence of a showing that by implication, if not
otherwise, the privilege of withdrawal was one
of the terms of the deposit. Such a showing was
permissible during the joint liv·es, for it was then
opposed by nothing except a presumption to the
contrary. It was no longer permissible after
either depositor was dead, for it was then opposed
by a presumption declared to be conclusive.

POINT III.
THE JOINT TENANCY AGREEMENT IS UNIMPAIRED
BY THE STEW ART ACTION.

The rule in Holt v. Bayles is conditioned upon there
being no fraud, mistake, or undue influence. Appellant
claims neither fraud nor undue influence, but, on page 7,
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asserts that thiH case should be distinguished from Holt v.
l~ayles by the filing of the Stewart action in which the
complaint contains allegations of lack of donative intent,
mistake, and original ownership of the funds in the plaintiff.
Although Appellant asserts ownership of the fund
as one of the distinctions between this case and Holt v.
Bayles, the allegation of the complaint falls short of asserting ownership in the plaintiff. The complaint states:
The said Adeline M. Ingalls has never put
any funds into either of the said savings accounts
and this plaintiff was not, nor is he now, obligated
to the said Adeline M. Ingalls in any sun1 or
amount.
If original ownership of the funds were an issue, the
fact is that the funds in question were created through
the joint efforts of Ben Stewart and his wife, who predeceased him, who is the mother of Respondent. However,
ownership of the funds is no distinction as the deceased
joint tenant in Holt v. Bayles was the original owner of
the funds. The Court stated with respect thereto:
We do not regard the question of the original
ownership of the money as controlling under the
particular facts of this case.
If mistake is alleged in the Stewart complaint it is
no basis for distinction. The complaint alleges:
That at the time plaintiff placed the name of
said Adeline M. Ingalls on said pass books he did
not know or realize that by doing so he was· plac-
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ing his said savings account at the disposal of the
said Adeline M. Ingalls or that he was placing her
in a position where she would inherit all of said
accounts upon his death or that he was placing
himself in a position that he could not dispose of
the said accounts by will or other disposition.
Obviously the foregoing is not an allegation of mistake of fact, but merely an allegation of mistake of law,
and as such is no ground for relief. The general rule is
stated in 17 'C.J.S. 500: "A mistake of law will not invalidate a contract."
This ·Court, in Board of Education v. Board of Education, 85 Utah 276, 39 P.2d 340 quoted with approval
from 13 C.J. 379 :
The author says that it is laid down in generallanguage in many cases that a mistake, in order
that it may affect a contract, must be a mistake
of fact, and that a mere mistake of law will not
affect the enforceability of an agreement, and that
a mistake of law is where the person knows the
facts of the case but is ignorant of the legal consequences.
The third distinction asserted by Appellant is lack
of donative intent. The allegation of the complaint in this
regard is:
He never intended that the said Adeline
M. Ingalls should have an inheritable interest to
all of said savings accounts. That since the placing of her name on said puss books this plaintiff

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
has given said Adeline M. Ingalls approximat~ely
the sum of $4,000.00, which is the full amount he
intended for her to have of his estate.
Appellant apparently relie~ upon the Demir is case
as authority for this point, as he states that it "held that
a joint bank account was not created because the decedent
had not intended to create the same."
The Demiris case is not subject to the si1npiification
Appellant would desire. The age, physical and 1nental
condition of the decedent at the time of the creation of
the joint account, the marital background, the claim of
the exercise of undue influence on the decedent by his
\vife, and the alleged wrongful act of the wife in the withdrawal of the funds, were all involved in the Demiris case.
Certainly the Demiris case is no authority for the proposition that a joint tenancy may be avoided solely by
lack of intent to create the same. The real basis for the
holding of the Demiris case was not lack of intent on the
part of the decedent but the wrongful act of the surviving
joint tenant in ursurping the funds. !The majority opinion
stated, on page 99 of 354 P .2d
We are in accord with the doctrine that \vhen
the wife withdrew all of the funds fro1n the account in the lifetime of her husband, obviously
for the purpose of getting possession for herself,
with the intention of wrongfully deprtving him
of his rights therein, her action was inimical to
the relationship that exists between joint tenants
and this act violative of the relationship· rendered
the question as to the true ownership open to
determination. (Emphasis ours.)
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Justice Ilenroid, who wrote a separate opinion, thought
the holding should be based upon undue unfluence of the
surviving joint tenant.
The allegation of lack 'Of intent is in the nature of
a unilateral mistake, which affords no basis for relief.
The author, in 12 Am. Jur, page 624, says:
It has been declared that if, in the expression
of the intention of one of the parties to an alleged
contract, there is error, and that error is unknown
to, and unsuspected by, the other party, that which
was so expressed by the one party and agreed
to by the other is a valid and binding contract,
which the party not in error may enforce. In other
words, a party to a contract cannot avoid it on
the ground that he made a mistake where there
has been no misrepresentation, there is no ambiguity in the terms of the contract, and the other
contractor has no notice of such mistake and acts
in perfect good faith. A unilateral error, it has
been said, does not avoid a contract.
The danger of the doctrine urged by Appellant is
apparent. Legal relationships would have no sanctity or
finality if the·y could be abrogated by a subsequent unilateral, self-serving declaration of one of the parties. that
he did not intend that \vhich he had previously done.
E'specially is this true if such were permitted after the
party had died, as it would open up a field of inquiry
which 1night be subject to rank hearsay.
We have found no case in which an action attacking
a joint tenancy agreement was pending at the time of
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the death of ·one of the joint tenants which was thereafter
adjudieated. The author, in the annotation at 46 A.L.R.
~d 91 ~' at page 956, says :
'l1 he mere comrnencing of an action to obtain

a partition of joint-tenancy property does not
operate as a severance of the joint tenancy. Dando
v Dando (1940) 37 Cal App2d 371, 99 P2d 561;
'l1 eutenberg v Schiller (1955) 138 Cal App2d 18,
291 P2d 53; Ellison v Murphy (1927) 128 l\Iisc
471, 219 NYS 667.
"It is not the filing of the partition action
"\\rhich terminates the joint tenancy, but only the
judgment in such action'' which has that effect.
Teutenberg v. Schiller (1955) 138 ·Cal App 2d 18,
291 P2d 53.
The foregoing cases involved real property. The author,
however, cites Child v. Bulmer (Eng. 3 Ch 59), which
apparently involved bank accounts. The author's statement is:
In ·Child v Bulmer, where a fund had been
carried to the separate account of three infants
as joint tenants, and when the eldest of them attained the age of 21 (thereupon becoming entitled
to receive one-third of the fund) he proceeded
through solicitors to obtain payment of his s.hare,
and accordingly an amended summons was issued
returnable on the 28th of March, and the parties
attended on that day, but, owing to the pressure
of business, the matter was not then reached and
it was adjourned to April 22, it was held, the
claimant having died in the interval of delay,
that since no order was made in the matter and
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until an order was made the claimant was "completely master of proceedings" and at liberty to
discontinue them at any moment if he thought
fit on paying costs, no severance resulted, and
his share consequently inured to the others.
Appellant makes reference to the statement of Justice ·Cordoza in the concurring opinion in Moskowitz v.
Th1:arTo\v, 167 N. E. 506, wherein he· says: "The question
is not here whether a like result would follow if a suit

to establi:sh an agreement at \var with the presumption
had then been pending, undetermined.'' (Emphasis
ours.)
This Court need have no more concern

"\\~ith

a pend-

ing suit ''to establish an agree1nent" then did the Court
of Appeals in the Thfosko\\7"itz case for the Ste,vart comp~laint alleges no "agreen~ent." It contains nothing other
than allegations of conclusions of law, unilateral mistake,
and self-serving declarations, nor does it purport to attack the joint tenancy agree1nents on the ground of fraud,
duress, n1istake of fact, undue influence or otherwise.
It does not state a cause of action, and the joint tenancy
agree1nents are uni1npaired thereby.
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CONCLUSION
The intention to create joint tenancy agreements is
elearly expressed in the written signature cards. This
Court is bound by the agreement of the pHrties. Thejoint tenancy agreements were not destroyed by notice
to the loan companies nor by the Stewart action. Respondent is entitled to the funds as surviving joint tenant.
Judgment of the lower court should be affirmed.
Respecfully submitted,
Harold R. Boyer
Of ROMNEY, BOYER AND RONNOW
Attorneys for Respondent
1409 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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